A message like this should definitely be allowed to air on the forum, though I find it emotionally driven rather than a practical plan of replacing leadership. If a vote passes that asks me to step down i will, and will hand-off to the best of my abilities. However, this SIP as written puts user funds at risk for these reasons below, and it is definitely not mature enough to be considered for an actual vote.
- You explicitly don’t nominate replacements, yet mandate immediate removals / permission stripping on a 48h clock. Meanwhile the “ISC” election can take up to ~14 days. That creates a leadership + accountability vacuum during the highest‑risk window for a protocol coordinating security + treasury.
- The handover/key-rotation plan assumes full cooperation from the same people you’re stripping of authority. Deadlines aren’t an enforcement mechanism, and “transfer to ISC custodians” is undefined until the ISC even exists.
- The “if it never reaches a vote, it proves the point” framing is unfalsifiable (heads‑I‑win / tails‑you-lose) and reads like rhetoric, not evidence.
- ISC selection is popularity-based (top 5 by votes) with no minimum ops/security/treasury competence requirement, which increases capture and execution risk.
Also, please bear in mind that the entire idea of rediverting protocol revenues from stakers to the exchequer is because Sovryn is not cash flow positive, and we’re trying to make sure it stays up for as long as it can without burning through treasury funds. The economic reality of companies that can’t sustain themselves is normally to close down. This is a last resort option that I wouldn’t like to execute, but if the alternative is risking the deposits of user funds, then this would be the way to go.
This is my own personal view on this matter.