SIP-0065: Permission update on the Adoption and Development Funds

Dear Sovryns,

To reduce operational overhead, we are suggesting to update the permissions on the adoption and development fund: SIPS/ at SIP-0065 · DistributedCollective/SIPS · GitHub

We intend to start the vote on Monday.

Currently, the adoption fund is controlled by bitocracy. In the fund are 27,296,309.2 SOV

If I read this SIP correctly, the bitocracy would relinquish control of this and give sole control to the Exchequer Committee.
We know that Core team members were recently hacked.
Why the hell would we do that?

The time to vote is far too short for such a drastic change. Along with the recent discord hack, SOV stakers should be extremely cautious and question what is being described here.


I agree with Sacro,

I don’t believe Ororo has been hacked. The bitocracy process has many steps that need to be compromised. That’s precisely why it’s good to leave the control of the Adoption Fund in the hands of the Bitocracy.

In principle, the control of the bitocracy is more beneficial, regardless of the cost.

Since this issue is extremely important and hasn’t been mentioned in the community call, I need more explanations to understand the motivation. I propose suspending the voting for the necessary time; it shouldn’t be voted on Monday, even if it wins with the votes of 18 people who have the necessary voting power.

If that small group of power is going to vote anyway, I kindly request that they create an intermediate Adoption Fund with one million sov for the intended purposes. When it reaches zero, it can be recharged with another million, always with the endorsement of the bitocracy.

Stay Sovryn.


I like your thinking here. A compromise. A certain sum. See how it goes. Seems less drastic. Also, don’t underestimate the effect it could have in public discussions. Bitocracy would be just a pretense tool. And no one could claim otherwise. All the ethos talk and what Sovryn’s powerful tool could achieve in time would be degraded to eloquent blabber.

I will definitely vote against this. I will vote against it - not that it matters, since the team controls most of the voting power- but to show my extreme displeasure with what is the exact opposite of decentralization, coming through the window without discussion like a thief on the night.
This is a huge step backwards and somewhere between disingenuous and nefarious.

Initially, the expectation was that Adoption funds are programmatically held by the smart contract -which controlled issuance. When unlocked however, it was intended and expected that they would be directed automatically to Exchequer.

Over time, however, Exchequer has deployed less SOV that was initially anticipated and the excess SOV has not been transferred to Exchequer. I can see clear benefits to providing exchequer opportunity to utilize these funds seamlessly - and that was what was initially expected. However, I also see definite benefits to requiring the unlocked SOV to be formally transferred to Exchequer (or anywhere else) on the basis of SIPs.

I haven’t made up my mind fully yet - but I am leaning towards the rejecting this SIP.

In any event, I think Monday is too soon for a vote and we require more time for discussion.

On another note: @lactarius and @theberni - you both have expressed the falehood that some small number of “founders” control the majority of votes or whatever. This hasn’t been true ever and is most certainly not true now. It borders on loonytunes conspiracy talk. Please update your facts.


Firstly, I appreciate any delay in the voting to enrich the debate, and your perspective always adds depth to it.

Regarding my statement that eighteen individual votes will be enough to direct the vote, I stand by it. I encourage you to observe the number of wallets that have decided the outcome of each SIP from the beginning, add up the votes needed to achieve quorum, and the total volume in favor of each SIP. Quantify how many wallets make up that percentage and validate or invalidate my presumption. I am willing to publicly apologize if I am mistaken. For example, in the last vote, out of the 30 votes cast, twelve wallets were enough to push through SIP63. There is nothing wrong with that; they are just undeniable facts.

I want to clarify two things:

First, I never said that the group controlling the voting power were founders.
Second, whether it’s eighteen, twenty-three, or twelve, and whether they are founders or not, they have every right to exercise their bitocratic power.

I am not judging; I am merely observing and analyzing. In these moments, the power of reason must prevail over emotion. I dislike lying, slandering, or conspiring. I believe I will have to demonstrate my admiration and love for Sovryn for a longer time; I have no problem with that.

I am simply asking that group of power to carefully consider their vote and to value intermediate paths, such as partially or sequentially relinquishing control of the Fund.

Stay Sovryn!


Who is “we”?
And what operational overhead?

How does this reduce operational overhead?

Whether it helps or not, i would definitely be voting against this SIP if it comes to a vote.


I would like to share a few thoughts and concerns below and hope Exchequer members can answer this:

  1. Why wasn’t this SIP mentioned in the community call on Thursday? When such a substantial amount of SOV is involved, the way this SIP is presented seems extremely suspect to me.

  2. Why are Exchequer members making it sound like the adoption pool funds are entirely designated for Exchequer? Although I respect the members of the Exchequer very much and they have often proven to act for the good of Sovryn, I think it is wrong and dangerous to give the Exchequer committee even more power.
    The adoption pool has been held by Bitocracy since Sovryn launched. The Exchequer puts up budget proposals to get parts of this adoption funds from Bitocracy. See SIP 0019 - Exchequer Committee 2021 Budget
    and even more relevant
    SIPS/ at main · DistributedCollective/SIPS · GitHub

  3. For a long time there has been talk of transferring contract ownerships to the Bitocracy. See SIP-46
    SIPS/ at john-light-patch-3 · DistributedCollective/SIPS · GitHub

Why should the control of the biggest Bitocracy fund be transferred to the Exchequer now instead of pushing for SIP-46?


I invoke Chesterton’s Fence and move to vote against this proposal.


this would be an easy NO vote for me.


This is a very clear response and I think you all are right. While we should aim to keep the number of SIPs as low as we can for the dev teams’ as well as the voters’ sake, we should not give up more control as necessary to any other entity - regardless of how good the intent it.

We will review this and propose a better, more acceptable alternative.


which Monday is SIP vote intended to start?

I updated the SIP text. It is viewable still on the same link.
We are now suggesting to withdraw a total of 3M SOV. The proposal outlines the vesting schedule, how many tokens are available and how Exchequer deployed the SOV treasury until this point in time.
We intend to start the vote on Monday 19th of June.


There is giant typo in the SIP text. In the text on Github you are transferring 30,000,000 not 3,000,000.

’ This SIP will approve the transfer of a total of 3,0000,000 vested SOV from the Funds to the Exchequer to facilitate the ongoing development and adoption of the Sovryn protocol. Below is a breakdown of the distribution of SOV from the Funds (by Exchequer) to date, excluding SOV distributed as part of system rewards:’

In other parts of the SIP text its spelled out correctly, but i think the consistency is necessary.


Of course. Will correct. Thanks for pointing this out!

From what I can tell, this is used to pay core contributers and such. Will this extend the runway? I dont think the last budget report had this 3 million SOV ($1.1million at time of posting) in it.

The budget report does not include any SOV held by Exchequer for the calculation of runway. The SOV mentioned in this SIP is in addition to any other funds held in the treasury.